Business Email Compromise (BEC): how a supplier invoice is redirected
The invoice was expected. The supplier was known. The email came from the supplier's real address and continued an existing business conversation.
Only one detail had changed: the bank account.
In one anonymised client case, the message explained that future payments should be sent to a different account. The request was plausible and arrived with an invoice for real work. Nothing looked like mass phishing, and the client's own email environment had not been hacked.
The problem was on the other side of the conversation. The supplier's mailbox had been compromised. The attacker had access to genuine correspondence and used that trust to substitute payment instructions. At the time of the request, the supplier had not informed the client of the compromise.
This is Business Email Compromise (BEC): a criminal manipulates a trusted business conversation to make money or information go somewhere it should not.
What happened
The client regularly purchased services from the supplier. The names, project, amount and timing on the invoice were consistent with the relationship. The criminal did not need to invent a convincing transaction; a real transaction was already taking place.
After gaining access to the supplier's email, the attacker could understand:
- who at the client received invoices;
- how the supplier normally wrote to them;
- which invoice was due and when;
- the expected amount and currency; and
- the history of the commercial relationship.
The attacker then inserted different bank details into the payment process. Depending on the case, this can be done by sending a replacement invoice, editing an attachment, replying inside a genuine thread or creating a parallel conversation that excludes the real supplier contact.
The email did not need spelling mistakes, an unknown sender or a malicious attachment. It relied on facts stolen from the mailbox and on the assumption that a familiar email is a trustworthy instruction.
The issue became visible only when the genuine supplier followed up about an unpaid invoice. By then, the client believed it had paid, while the supplier had received nothing.
How this type of BEC works
A supplier-invoice BEC normally develops in stages.
1. A mailbox is compromised
The initial access may come from phishing, stolen credentials, a stolen session, malware or weak authentication. It can affect the customer, the supplier or an intermediary such as an accountant or logistics provider.
In this case, the compromised environment belonged to the supplier. That distinction is important: a company can have well-protected email and still receive a fraudulent instruction from a genuine external account.
2. The attacker studies normal business
The criminal often waits. Reading real messages reveals invoice cycles, signatures, approval language, time zones and the people involved. The attacker looks for a payment large enough to be worthwhile and ordinary enough not to attract attention.
3. The attacker takes control of the conversation
They may create forwarding or inbox rules, delete replies, mark messages as read or move them into an obscure folder. These changes can allow the attacker to observe the thread while preventing the legitimate mailbox owner from seeing questions or warnings.
4. One critical detail is changed
The real supplier, service and amount can remain unchanged. Only the beneficiary name, bank, account number or payment route is replaced. A short explanation—such as a bank change, audit, currency issue or new collection account—makes the exception feel administrative rather than dangerous.
5. Discovery is delayed
The attacker may answer follow-up questions, confirm receipt or tell each side that the other is processing the matter. The objective is to create enough delay for the money to move beyond the first receiving account.
Why the email can look completely legitimate
Many awareness messages teach people to look for poor grammar, strange domains and unexpected attachments. Those signs remain useful, but they are not sufficient for BEC.
When a real mailbox is compromised:
- the sender address may be correct;
- the message can pass SPF, DKIM and DMARC checks;
- the email may appear inside a genuine thread;
- the invoice description and amount may be accurate; and
- the attacker can answer questions using information from previous messages.
Email authentication helps prevent some forms of spoofing. It does not prove that the authorised account holder is the person operating a compromised mailbox.
How to recognise a possible BEC
The strongest warning sign is not how the email looks. It is what the message asks the business to change.
Payment and process indicators
- New or amended bank details, even when the explanation sounds reasonable.
- A request to pay a different legal entity, country or currency.
- Pressure to process the invoice before normal verification is complete.
- A request to keep the change confidential or communicate only by email.
- Instructions that bypass procurement, vendor-master or dual-approval controls.
- A mismatch between the beneficiary and the supplier named in the contract or invoice.
Conversation indicators
- A supplier unexpectedly changes the people copied on the thread.
- A familiar contact becomes unusually insistent about a routine payment.
- Replies arrive at odd times or use slightly different terminology.
- Telephone numbers or contact details change at the same time as bank details.
- The supplier appears not to receive a message that should have reached them.
- A new address is introduced for “accounts” or “management” during the exchange.
Technical indicators in a suspected mailbox
- Unknown forwarding settings or recently created inbox rules.
- Messages found in deleted, junk, RSS or archive folders without explanation.
- Unusual sign-ins, new devices, unexpected locations or unfamiliar applications.
- MFA methods, recovery details or mailbox permissions changed without approval.
- Missing sent messages or replies that the user does not remember sending.
- External forwarding or automatic deletion of messages containing invoice-related terms.
Any one indicator can have an innocent explanation. A bank-account change should still trigger independent verification every time.
The verification that would have stopped it
Do not verify a payment change by replying to the same email, calling a number in the new message or using contact details printed on the amended invoice. If the conversation is controlled by an attacker, those routes lead back to the attacker.
Instead:
- Retrieve the supplier contact and telephone number from an existing vendor record, contract or previously verified source.
- Contact that person through a separate channel and ask them to confirm the precise beneficiary name, bank and account details.
- Require a second authorised person to review the evidence and the verified callback record.
- Notify the established supplier contact when the vendor-master record is changed.
- Stop the payment if independent verification cannot be completed.
The question should be specific. “Did you send this invoice?” may receive a yes because the underlying invoice is real. Confirm the changed payment details themselves.
Dual approval is valuable, but it is not independent verification if both approvers use the same compromised email as their evidence.
How to protect the business
Effective BEC protection combines payment controls, email hardening, supplier governance and rehearsed human decisions.
Strengthen payment controls
- Treat every new or changed bank account as a high-risk event.
- Separate the roles that request, create and approve vendor-master changes.
- Require a documented callback using pre-existing contact information.
- Apply an appropriate cooling-off period or enhanced review after a bank change.
- Alert the established supplier contact when payment details are amended.
- Reconcile overdue invoices and supplier statements promptly.
- Make it explicit that urgency and seniority never override verification.
Harden email and identity systems
- Require strong, preferably phishing-resistant, multifactor authentication.
- Disable obsolete authentication and review risky third-party application access.
- Monitor unusual sign-ins, session activity and changes to MFA methods.
- Alert on external forwarding and suspicious inbox rules.
- Configure SPF, DKIM and DMARC to reduce direct domain spoofing.
- Protect finance, procurement, executives and administrators with stronger policies.
- Retain sufficient email and identity logs for investigation.
These measures should also be expected from important suppliers. Contracts and supplier security requirements can define timely notification of a suspected mailbox compromise, named security contacts and an agreed process for changing payment details.
Train the people who handle payments
Generic phishing training is not enough. Finance, procurement, executive assistants and vendor-management teams should practise realistic invoice-diversion scenarios. They need to know:
- why a genuine sender address can still be unsafe;
- how to perform an independent callback;
- which changes require escalation;
- how to preserve suspicious messages; and
- that pausing an urgent payment will be supported by management.
Training works best when it tests the real process, including email, telephone, supplier records and approval responsibilities—not only whether someone clicks a link.
If a suspicious invoice has already been paid
Act immediately. Do not wait for a complete investigation before contacting the bank.
- Call the sending bank through an official number and request recall, tracing or freezing of the receiving funds.
- Contact the genuine supplier through a trusted channel and establish which mailbox or conversation was affected.
- Preserve the original email, full headers, attachments, payment records and relevant logs rather than relying only on screenshots.
- Secure affected accounts by revoking sessions, resetting credentials, reviewing MFA changes and removing malicious rules or forwarding.
- Search for other altered invoices, bank-detail changes and conversations involving the same accounts.
- Notify law enforcement, insurers and relevant group or regulatory stakeholders through the applicable channels.
The client and supplier need to coordinate. The fact that the initial compromise occurred at the supplier does not remove the client's need to contact its bank, preserve evidence and check whether other payments were targeted.
Build a process that does not rely on trusting an email
The lesson from this case is not “never trust suppliers.” It is that email alone should not be able to change where company money is sent.
APIS Consulting can help organisations test and strengthen that control through:
- realistic BEC and invoice-fraud awareness training;
- finance and supplier-payment simulations;
- Microsoft 365 and email-security hardening;
- MFA, mailbox-rule and sign-in monitoring reviews;
- SPF, DKIM and DMARC assessment; and
- incident-response and payment-verification procedures.
Try the five-minute Business Email Compromise challenge, or contact APIS Consulting to arrange practical training, email hardening or a review of your supplier-payment controls.
Official guidance
- FBI: Business Email Compromise
- UK NCSC: Business payment fraud
- Microsoft: Responding to a compromised email account
- CISA: Require multifactor authentication
Details of the client example have been generalised to preserve confidentiality. This article provides general security guidance; incident-response, notification and law-enforcement requirements depend on the organisations, accounts and jurisdictions involved.